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THE UPSIDE OF DEEP FAKES 
JESSICA SILBEY* & WOODROW HARTZOG** 
It’s bad.  We know.  The dawn of “deep fakes”—convincing videos and 
images of people doing things they never did or said—puts us all in jeopardy 
in several different ways.1  Professors Bobby Chesney and Danielle Citron 
have noted that now “false claims—even preposterous ones—can be peddled 
with unprecedented success today thanks to a combination of social media 
ubiquity and virality, cognitive biases, filter bubbles, and group polariza-
tion.”2  The scholars identify a host of harms from deep fakes, ranging from 
people being exploited, extorted, and sabotaged, to societal harms like the 
erosion of democratic discourse and trust in social institutions, undermining 
public safety, national security, journalism, and diplomacy, deepening social 
divisions, and manipulation of elections.3  But it might not be all bad.  Even 
beyond purported beneficial uses of deep-fake technology for education, art, 
and science, the looming deep-fake disaster might have a silver lining.  Hear 
us out.  We think deep fakes have an upside. 
Crucial to our argument is the idea that deep fakes don’t create new 
problems so much as make existing problems worse.  Cracks in systems, 
frameworks, strategies, and institutions that have been leaking for years now 
threaten to spring open.  Journalism, education, individual rights, democratic 
systems, and voting protocols have long been vulnerable.  Deep fakes might 
just be the straw that breaks them.  And therein lies opportunity for repair. 
People have had good ideas about how to repair democratic institutions 
and frameworks for years.  A leading example is the movement to overturn 
the Supreme Court decision Citizens United v. Federal Election Commis-
sion,4 which allowed corporations and nonprofits to raise and spend unlim-
ited amounts of money to advocate for and against political candidates, giv-
ing rise to super PACs and, many say, the profound distortion of election 
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 1.  See Robert Chesney & Danielle Citron, Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge for Privacy, 
Democracy, and National Security, 107 CALF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019), https://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3213954. 
 2.  Robert Chesney & Danielle Citron, Deep Fakes: A Looming Crisis for National Security, 
Democracy and Privacy?, LAWFARE (Feb. 21, 2018, 10:00 AM), https://www.lawfare-
blog.com/deep-fakes-looming-crisis-national-security-democracy-and-privacy.   
 3.  See Chesney & Citron, supra note 1. 
 4.  558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
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politics.5  Another suggestion has been revamping education: making K-12 
education less about standardized tests and more about cultivating a love of 
learning and making higher education more affordable without saddling col-
lege graduates with life-long debt.6  Often what’s been missing is the political 
will to make them happen.  Infrastructure isn’t a titillating political goal.  Ed-
ucators are continuously struggling for more funding.  Voting reform is often 
too politically risky or costly to take on.  Many of the harms to our basic 
institutions have been incremental as they seem destined to suffer death by a 
thousand cuts. 
Perhaps these small incursions into our technologies and civic institu-
tions haven’t been significant enough to foment a meaningful appetite for 
reform.  Or perhaps lawmakers and the public simply can’t get angry about 
ephemeral and sometimes difficult to describe harms to concepts like due 
process, data integrity, and collective intelligence that are not felt viscerally. 
Sometimes we just need a push.  And deep fakes make for a memorable bully. 
That’s because deep fakes are lies.  And not just lies, but ones that betray 
sight and sound, two of our most innate and cherished senses.  Deep fakes 
call into question an entire lexicon of deeply held truths and axioms about 
the trustworthiness of what we see and hear with our own eyes and ears.  “I’ll 
believe it when I see it.”  “Out of sight, out of mind.”  “A picture is worth a 
thousand words.” 
The potential upside of deep fakes is that they might help muster the 
political will to address the larger, structural problems made worse by the 
inability to trust what we see and hear.  In other words, maybe an effective 
way to respond to the scourge of deep fakes isn’t to target the creation and 
use of deep fakes themselves, but rather to focus on strengthening the social 
and political institutions they disrupt.  Now would be a good time to focus on 
institutional inoculation, fortitude, redundancy, and resiliency.  Deep fakes 
are a symptom of deep problems.  Wouldn’t it be ironic if the symptom is 
scarier than the sickness and finally compels us to solve the underlying prob-
lems? 
Below we briefly address some deep problems and how finally address-
ing them may also neutralize the destructive force of deep fakes.  We only 
describe three cultural institutions–education, journalism, and representative 
democracy—with deep problems that could be strengthened as a response to 
deep fakes for greater societal gains.  But we encourage readers to think up 
                                                          
 5.  See, e.g., John Dunbar, The ‘Citizens United’ Decision and Why It Matters, CTR. FOR PUB. 
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 6.  See discussion of education reform infra. 
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more.  We have a hunch that once we harness the upside of deep fakes, we 
may unlock creative solutions to other sticky social and political problems. 
Education 
Public education needs a reboot.  A decade ago, Common Core was 
supposed to raise the level of skills in English literacy and mathematics to 
help students succeed in college and beyond.7  A decade prior we had No 
Child Left Behind, a federally led program that initiated standardized testing 
on which school districts would be evaluated in order to receive federal 
funds.8  The goals of these programs are worthy but their picayune focus on 
outcome assessments for teachers and school districts and standardized test-
ing for students misses the bigger picture.  In a world of rapidly changing 
technology with increasing access to the world’s intellectual resources, with 
students and younger generations leading the way on what can be done with 
these technologies, we need to be teaching students where they are at.  We 
need more literacy, yes, but we need cultural and media literacy; we need 
more arts, civics, drama, and experimental sciences; we need more physical 
activity that builds collaboration not stressed-out competition. 
Students and citizens need to be empowered and taught to talk with and 
back to the stories told through our new media.  In general, readers and cul-
tural consumers developed critical capacities toward propaganda.  Over the 
twentieth century, movie-goers and television watchers have learned to dis-
tinguish the made-up from the real, fiction from the news.9  To be sure, at 
first, genres like “reality television” and “docu-drama” had viewers 
stumped.10  But eventually, viewers learned to understand that People’s 
Court, The Apprentice, Survivor, and The Bachelor were more staged perfor-
mances (with makeup, props, and a scripted storyline) than improvisations 
on a live stage or reality unaffected by the need to entertain a television au-
dience.  Our education as cultural critics needs to continue.  And we do that 
by playing with the technologies, taking them apart and rebuilding them, tell-
ing stories with them and understanding their power.  And then, as our chil-
dren study world cultures, the humanities, and experiment with the natural 
world and witness its depletion, they will learn to debate and embrace core 
                                                          
 7.  Development Process, COMMON CORE: ST. STANDARDS INITIATIVE, 
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values that our twenty-first century digital age both amplifies and threatens.  
And they will bring us along. 
We should not be training students to take standardized tests and mem-
orize factors and formulae outside of the contexts in which they are mean-
ingful.  We should be teaching students (and continue to train ourselves) to 
evaluate facts, test systems, and challenge accounts by examining alternative 
perspectives.  This isn’t about the subjectivity of all stories or the relativity 
of truth.  We are not relativists when it comes to facts and cultural narratives.  
But we are realists.  And what we learn in the study of humanities and law is 
how stories work to sustain or undermine power.  We might as well 
acknowledge this as one way deep fakes function and work from within that 
structure to talk back to them.  Stories (fake or not) will never go away.  We 
have to learn how to have the narrative upper hand to produce critical thinkers 
and win the battle for truth.11  To students schooled this way, deep fakes may 
be annoying—they might even be amusing—but they will not be quite as 
disruptive to our children’s hopeful future if education trains them to be cu-
rious, collaborative, skeptical, and productive. 
Media 
Fake news is nothing new.12  The virality and scope of influence of fake 
news is.13  And the networked platforms that connect news organizations to 
readers—Facebook, Twitter, Reddit, Tumblr—are new too.  Also new is the 
contracted time of news cycles and the freemium business model for news.  
We don’t pay for journalism as much (or at all) anymore.  And we can curate 
our own news by selecting from hundreds of television channels, shows, and 
radio stations, to attend to the one that confirms our own views and comports 
with our own politics.  The rise of extreme right-wing media and the demise 
of traditional gatekeepers in the media ecosystem is new.14  This is fodder for 
polarization and cognitive laziness.15  Indeed, as much as we may praise the 
information floodgate that is the internet, platforms like Facebook and “Twit-
ter . . . encourage[] a mind-set antithetical to journalistic inquiry: [They] 
prize[] image over substance and ‘cheap dunks’ over reasoned debate, all the 
                                                          
 11.  Jessica Silbey, What We Do When We Do Law and Popular Culture, 27 LAW & SOC. 
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while severely abridging the temporal scope of the press.”16  In other words, 
our personalized, networked, firehose news feeds are rich soil for cultivating 
deep fakes. 
We should collectively encourage and invest in trusted journalism and 
reestablish institutional norms of authentication and verification—for exam-
ple, fact checking that requires standards of proof.  We understand that news 
organizations seeking to generate shared knowledge with a claim to objectiv-
ity are pressured for funds and need as many eyeballs on their sites to ramp 
up advertising revenue lost to the paper versions of yore.  Not every paper 
can have a benefactor like Jeff Bezos to make sure “democracy [doesn’t] 
die[] in darkness.”17  And newspapers should not be driven to depend on bot-
tom-line driven platforms like Facebook or networks like Google for adver-
tising dollars.  Eyeballs demand catchy headlines and lots of photographs.  
But click bait luring readers to a non-story with lots of pop-up advertisements 
is a videogame, not news.  And trolling Instagram for free photos from any-
one with a camera phone produces inaccuracies and gossip.  We need to com-
mit to investigative journalism and photojournalists whose professionaliza-
tion as truth seekers and truth tellers are so central to our democracy we 
protected the press from government interference in the First Amendment to 
our Constitution. 
We could also empower advocacy organizations like Witness, whose 
goal is to make “possible for anyone, anywhere to use video and technology 
to protect and defend human rights.”18  Crucially, Witness aims to bolster the 
legitimacy and preserve the integrity of these videos by developing trustwor-
thy tools, advocate to tech companies to make systematic changes, and “cu-
rate and help draw attention to citizen footage of under-reported stories.”19  
They prioritize archiving video and preserving its integrity for use in court, 
among other things.20  Perhaps the vivid threat of deep fakes can muster will 
to salvage journalism from the ravages of an economic system transformed 
                                                          
 16.  Farhad Manjoo, Never Tweet, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2019), https://www.ny-
times.com/2019/01/23/opinion/covington-twitter.html; see Heather Schwedel, “Dunking” Is Deli-
cious Sport, SLATE (Dec. 4, 2017), https://slate.com/technology/2017/12/dunking-is-delicious-and-
also-probably-making-twitter-terrible.html (describing basketball “dunking” as a metaphor for 
Twitter behavior: “In a Twitter dunking, someone has made his point or said her piece, and instead 
of responding to it with a direct reply, perhaps in the spirit of equal-footed debate, the dunker seizes 
it like an alley-oop on his or her way to the basket.  Maybe another player gets the unwitting assist, 
but the point is yours to be liked and retweeted not just as a reply but as a worthier tweet in its own 
right.”).  
 17.  Paul Farhi, The Washington Post’s New Slogan Turns Out to Be an Old Saying, WASH. 
POST (Feb. 24, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/the-washington-posts-new-
slogan-turns-out-to-be-an-old-saying/2017/02/23/cb199cda-fa02-11e6-be05-
1a3817ac21a5_story.html?utm_term=.71203ab5c5ed. 
 18.  About, WITNESS, https://witness.org/about/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2019).  
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Our Work, WITNESS, https://witness.org/our-work/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2019). 
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by technology that appears to value viral lies over truth by subsidizing a free 
press with public funds and incentivizing the reestablishment of the journal-
istic profession.21 
Democratic Institutions 
Can deep fakes actually foster meaningful changes for our democratic 
institutions?  One of the nightmare scenarios presented by deep fakes is a 
video that is released right before election day that wrongly affects the result 
of an election.  But perhaps this scenario would not be so frightening if our 
electoral framework were sturdier and less besieged.  Lawmakers could start 
by better pursuing electoral integrity, which includes ensuring more people 
vote and their votes count.  Increasing the number of voters might help dilute 
the negative effect a deep fake would produce and have the additional benefit 
of better ensuring a representative democracy. 
Improving electoral integrity would mean drawing more representative 
districts, expanding the time to vote (or calling for holidays on election days), 
demanding accessible voting places, and designing ballots and ballot ma-
chines to record votes accurately.  We need to rethink the Electoral College 
and align the popular vote with the presidency, unless we think it’s okay that 
the votes in less populous states count three times as those in more populous 
states.22  We need to have term limits on senators and congresspeople, like 
we do the presidency, or else make it easier to run against incumbents so this 
can truly be a government of the people.  We need more parties and rank 
choice voting to encourage the middle ground and compromise candidates 
who will bridge polarization that feeds news cycles and exhausts internet us-
ers.  Some of these solutions are already in the works, in part because the 
2016 election took advantage of so many of these deep problems.23  Deep 
fakes might still be working its way into the cultural lexicon, but fake news 
is already there. 
                                                          
 21.  We could also disincentivize the platforms from spreading fake news or incentivize them 
to curate their platforms more closely, as others have suggested (for example, narrowing 230 im-
munity).  See, e.g., DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE (2014); OLIVIER 
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WASH. POST. (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
cage/wp/2016/11/17/the-electoral-college-badly-distorts-the-vote-and-its-going-to-get-
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the-least-in-the-electoral-college-74280. 
 23.  Eric Maskin, Five Reasons Ranked-Choice Voting Will Improve American Democracy, 
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But it goes deeper than that.  Political, social, and economic inequality, 
bred through the alienation of individuals from their communities of support, 
feeds peoples’ receptiveness to disinformation.  As Claire Wardle writes, 
“When humans are angry and fearful, their critical thinking skills dimin-
ish.”24  With more participation and enthusiasm for self-government, the ben-
efits of which should begin with those who have the least, the governmental 
institutions that sustain us will work for us all.  And the deep fakes that aim 
to dismantle them will be outvoted by those who believe and know better. 
Making Lemonade 
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution promises: freedom of the 
spiritual mind, freedom to speak what’s on our minds, freedom to publish 
and distribute our ideas, arguments and discoveries, freedom to organize and 
assemble around those ideas, and freedom to petition the government to make 
change.25  The First Amendment is a microcosm of the mechanics of self-
government, but it also provides fertile ground for its destruction in the form 
of mob rule or autocracy.  Indeed, the First Amendment demands protection 
and breathing room for expression that, as a side effect, constructs the breed-
ing ground for deep fakes.  But we cannot solve the deep-fakes problem by 
treating it solely as an issue of speech without jeopardizing the protections 
for expression critical to our democracy.  Resilient infrastructure and institu-
tions that educate all our children, provide media literacy and journalistic au-
tonomy as well as deliver equal access to the political process will help us 
better protect and foster expression while keeping its excesses from devour-
ing free expression goals of autonomy and democratic self-governance. 
We need to find a vaccine to the deep fake, and that will start with un-
derstanding that authentication is a social process sustained by resilient and 
inclusive social institutions.  Writing about the conman and the contexts in 
which he flourishes, MIT anthropologist Graham Jones has said that the “fake 
is only possible when there are normative, conventionalized, institutionalized 
standards of conduct and evidentiary practices that the faker can manipu-
late.”26  Today, as deep fakes circulate more widely and rapidly threaten to 
undermine our critical institutions and civil rights, it should be our choice and 
mandate to establish standards and institutions that are resilient to the con.  
Transforming our education, journalism, and elections to focus on building 
these standards subject to collective norms of accuracy, dignity, and democ-
racy will be a critical first step to understanding the upside of deep fakes. 
                                                          
 24.  Claire Wardle, Fake News. It’s Complicated., FIRST DRAFT (Feb. 16, 2017), https://first-
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 25.  See U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 26.  Graham M. Jones, Deep Fakes, in FAKE 15, 21 (Jacob Copeman & Giovanni de Col eds., 
2018). 
